The recent decision in Greenaker v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company, 1 is a clear rebuke of a troubling trend in property insurance claims. Insurers are making creative interpretations of actual cash value that leave policyholders receiving far less than what they lost.
The policyholders suffered a covered loss and presented an estimate reflecting both replacement cost and actual cash value. The insurer partially paid, then moved in limine to exclude all of the policyholders’ damage evidence. The insurer argued that because the repairs had not been performed, the insureds could not recover replacement cost. It further argued that labor and other non-material costs could not qualify as part of the actual cash value. The trial court agreed and excluded all damage evidence.
The appellate court reversed. The most important part of this opinion is the court’s rejection of the insurer’s attempt to redefine actual cash value into something unrecognizable. The court squarely addressed the insurer’s argument and did not mince words:
Universal and the trial court advance an inordinately narrowed definition of actual cash value (ACV) that includes only the cost of physical materials that were damaged and excludes all other intangible costs such as the labor required to install such materials. Universal describes the Greenakers’ intangible costs—such as labor—required to install the physical items to replace the damaged property as ‘indirect, anticipated future repair costs,’ and Universal contends that such costs ‘were simply not ACV because they were not actual, tangible physical damage directly caused by the storm (e.g., wind damage or interior water …..’
This definition is supported neither by the language of the replacement value insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor the decisional authority elaborating on the meaning of the term actual cash value as contrasted with replacement cost value.
The trend is for some insurers to reduce actual cash value to a stripped-down number representing only the cost of raw materials, essentially treating a home like a pile of depreciated lumber sitting on a lot. Labor, overhead, and other necessary costs to actually repair the damage are pushed aside and labeled as “future” or “replacement-only” expenses. This is a wrongful attempt to deprive policyholders of payments that are insufficient to begin any meaningful repairs.
The court rejected that approach and returned to first principles. Actual cash value is not a category of costs. It is a method of valuation. It includes the full scope of what is required to repair the damage, but at a depreciated value. Replacement cost value, by contrast, reflects that same scope of costs without depreciation. The difference between the two is not what is included. It is how those items are valued.
The court also made clear that insurers cannot import language from one part of the policy to distort another. The phrase “direct physical loss” determines whether coverage is triggered. It does not redefine how damages are calculated once coverage exists. Attempts to use that phrase to exclude labor or other necessary repair costs are, in effect, efforts to rewrite the policy after the loss has occurred.
Another important takeaway is the court’s recognition that policyholders do not need to complete repairs before they can prove actual cash value. The estimate provided by the insureds, showing replacement cost, depreciation, and resulting ACV, was sufficient evidence to present to a jury. In the real world, many policyholders cannot afford to complete repairs without receiving insurance proceeds first. Any rule requiring completed repairs as a prerequisite to proving damages would turn the claims process into a financial impossibility for many families.
This decision restores balance. It reminds courts and property claims adjusters that insurance policies must be interpreted based on their language, applicable statutes, and established precedent rather than creative theories designed to limit payments. It also reinforces that procedural rules exist for a reason.
For those interested in the concept of actual cash value in Florida, I suggest reading “Glens Falls Revisited: Actual Cash Value, Matching, and the Measure of True Indemnity in Florida” and Actual Cash Value Damages and The Broad Evidence Rule in Florida.
Thought For The Day
“The first duty of society is justice.”
— Alexander Hamilton
1 Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2d2024-1964 (Fla. 2d DCA May 8, 2026).