There are cases about coverage. There are cases about conditions precedent. And there are cases about lawyers. Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church v. Church Mutual is all three. 1
A small Indiana church suffered a devastating fire. The insurer paid actual cash value and some additional amounts, but a dispute remained over replacement cost and the cost of rebuilding components, such as the sanctuary ceiling. The policy contained the familiar replacement cost condition of no payment of replacement cost until the property is actually repaired or replaced, and only if that repair or replacement is made “as soon as reasonably possible.”
The church did not rebuild. Instead, it continued to dispute the insurer’s estimate. Two years passed. Suit was filed. The insurer moved for summary judgment, not on valuation, but on the condition precedent. Church Mutual’s argument was that the church did not repair or replace the building as required by the policy, so no replacement cost is owed. The trial court agreed with Church Mutual.
On appeal, new legal counsel argued that Indiana’s prevention doctrine barred the insurer from relying on the repair condition. Under Indiana law, an insurer cannot rely on a condition precedent when its own conduct prevents or hinders performance. The church argued that the insurer’s repeated inspections, delays, valuation disputes, and refusal to commit to tolling effectively suspended the rebuilding requirement.
Many courts across the country recognize that replacement cost conditions cannot be weaponized by insurers who are themselves contributing to the delay. If an insurer withholds payment or keeps the claim in limbo, it may not then turn around and complain that the insured failed to rebuild fast enough.
The problem is that argument was never properly made in the trial court by the prior counsel. The Seventh Circuit focused not on the nuances of Indiana insurance law, but on waiver. The court noted that the church’s trial counsel failed to respond to the insurer’s legal theory at summary judgment. Instead of engaging the condition precedent issue with case law and record citations, counsel attacked credibility and valuation disputes. That was not responsive to the dispositive argument.
With new counsel on appeal, the church attempted to revive the prevention doctrine and asked the court to apply civil plain-error review. The appellate brief spent considerable time documenting the prior lawyer’s disciplinary history and performance deficiencies. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged those problems and even referenced its own suspension of prior counsel.
But the court’s response was blunt. Even bad lawyering does not undo waiver in a civil case. The court held that by failing to raise the prevention doctrine argument at summary judgment, the church waived it. And even if the omission were characterized as forfeiture rather than waiver, plain-error review in civil cases is “rare” and reserved for extraordinary circumstances. This was not one of them.
The court also noted that Church Mutual had paid nearly $1.7 million. The church was not prevented from rebuilding by lack of funds; it chose to continue disputing part of the estimate before proceeding.
What are the lessons? First, replacement cost coverage is conditional coverage. The promise to pay replacement cost is powerful, but it is not automatic. If the policy requires actual repair or replacement “as soon as reasonably possible,” courts will enforce that language unless there is a properly preserved and proven legal excuse.
Second, the prevention doctrine is real, but it must be raised. If an insurer’s conduct is delaying rebuilding, the insured must build a clear record and make the legal argument squarely. Silence at summary judgment is not a smart strategy. Summary judgment is where insurance cases are often won or lost. Insurers increasingly frame dispositive motions around conditions precedent rather than valuation. If the insured does not meet the legal theory head-on with authority and record evidence, the merits of the estimate may never be reached.
Third, the careful selection of legal counsel is critical in property insurance disputes. This case is a reminder that civil litigants are bound by the acts and omissions of their chosen lawyers. Appellate courts do not function as malpractice insurers.
Insurance disputes are not merely about construction estimates. They are about sequencing facts, procedural posture, policy conditions, not missing suit limitation periods, and preservation of arguments. A lawyer who understands these dynamics can protect a policyholder’s rights. A lawyer who misses them can unintentionally forfeit the entire claim.
The tragedy in Crothersville is not that the church’s valuation argument lacked merit. It is that the court never truly reached the merits of the case.
Thought For The Day
“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”
—Powell v. Alabama
1 Crothersville Lighthouse Tabernacle Church v. Church Mutual Ins. Co., No. 22-1082, — F.4th —, 2026 WL 574106 (7th Cir. Mar. 2, 2026). See also, Appellant Lighthouse Tabernacle’s Brief.