A thoughtful comment posted in response to yesterday’s post, Engineering Standards or Engineered Outcomes for Insurance Companies, raises an issue that deserves further discussion. The comment states:
Chip, this is the scrutiny this process has needed from the start, and the question you posed at the end is the right one.
A significant issue, among the ones you raised, is that the rule displaces established consensus frameworks such as ASTM E2713 without explanation or justification. These are standards developed through a balanced process with broad professional participation, and the rule replaces them with prescriptive mandates that strip engineers of the professional judgment those frameworks are built on. Under the proposed rules, an engineer who applies sound reasoning to account for real-world conditions would face discipline for deviating from a checklist, not for producing bad work.
Additionally, the proposed mandates are not without consequence. Downstream impacts can be easily foreseen: compliance costs that price independent engineers out of the reach of the average policyholder, and a regulatory framework that undercuts the courts gatekeeping function. This conversation needs to happen in the open. Thank you for bringing this to the public’s attention.
For those unfamiliar with ASTM E2713, it is not some obscure technical manual. It is a widely accepted guideline used by engineers to investigate building damage. At its core, it requires engineers to gather facts, consider multiple possible causes, test those possibilities against evidence, and then reach conclusions grounded in science and observation. Importantly, it allows engineers to account for real-world conditions, which include considering the aging of materials, prior repairs, installation variability, and the messy reality of how structures actually perform over time.
In other words, ASTM E2713 is not a checklist. It is a disciplined way of thinking. The concern raised by the commenter is that the proposed Florida rules appear to move away from that flexible, judgment-based approach and toward something far more rigid. If true, that is a significant shift. When a regulatory framework replaces a consensus-based standard without clearly explaining why the existing standard is inadequate, it raises legitimate questions about both purpose and effect.
The issue is not whether standards should exist. Of course they should. The issue is whether those standards guide professional judgment or replace it.
Engineering, particularly forensic engineering, is not a mechanical exercise. Two buildings may look similar but perform very differently under the same storm conditions. Wind does not behave in neat, uniform patterns. Materials degrade. Fasteners loosen. Repairs alter performance. A system built on rigid mandates risks ignoring those realities in favor of simplified assumptions.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the other side of the equation. The push for reform did not arise in a vacuum. There have been concerns about inconsistent reports, unsupported conclusions, and, at times, opinions that appear driven more by advocacy than analysis. Those concerns are real and should not be dismissed.
A recent formal critique prepared by Grindley Williams Engineering 1 reinforces many of these concerns and adds a level of technical detail that engineering regulators must consider. According to the Grindley Williams critique, the rule contains “structural, definitional, and drafting deficiencies” that create ambiguity, impose impractical burdens, and produce unintended consequences. More importantly, it warns that the rule may “create enforcement exposure based on procedural technicalities rather than substantive engineering misconduct” and “unduly constrain professional engineering judgment.”
That is a profound shift. The critique highlights at least five issues about the proposed rules that go directly to the heart of fairness and accuracy in claims disputes. First, the rule repeatedly uses critical terms like “damage” and “damage evaluation” without defining them. That may sound like a drafting issue, but it is far more serious. If engineers cannot clearly determine what is being regulated, then compliance becomes subjective, and enforcement becomes inconsistent. In a litigation-driven environment like insurance claims, that kind of ambiguity can easily be used as a weapon.
Second, the rule assumes damage exists. It requires documentation of “observed and recorded damage,” without addressing situations where no damage is found. The critique warns that this could discourage engineers from concluding that no damage exists because such reports might be viewed as noncompliant. That is not a minor issue, but a structural bias against finding actual damage.
Third, the rule imposes extensive documentation and testing requirements that may be impossible in real-world conditions. Engineers often face limited access, missing records, safety constraints, and budget limitations. The critique notes that the rule fails to account for these realities, exposing engineers to disciplinary action even when they conduct competent investigations under practical constraints.
Fourth, the rule appears to mandate reliance on standards and testing protocols that were never designed for forensic damage analysis. For example, laboratory testing methods developed for new construction are being applied to aged, in-service roofs—conditions that engineers know are fundamentally different. The critique specifically points out that certain referenced tests “do not evaluate existing field conditions” and are not designed to determine real-world damage.
Fifth, and perhaps most troubling, the rule introduces mandatory procedural requirements that increase cost without clear benefit. The critique warns that compliance will “significantly increase the time, cost, and professional liability exposure” associated with engineering reports, leading to higher costs for policyholders and reduced access to independent experts.
This ties directly back to the commenter’s point in my blog post. If independent engineers are priced out of the market and replaced by large firms that can absorb compliance costs, the practical effect is not neutrality. It is consolidation. And consolidation, in a claims environment, tends to favor repeat players hired by the insurance industry.
There is also a deeper legal issue at play. The critique notes that the rule creates enforcement risk based on whether an engineer followed every procedural requirement rather than whether the engineering opinion is sound. That shifts the focus away from substance and toward compliance. In the courtroom, that matters. Courts are supposed to evaluate expert testimony based on reliability, methodology, and credibility. If regulatory compliance becomes the dominant measure, we risk creating a parallel system where an opinion can be technically correct but still subject to discipline for failing to check every box.
That is not how truth is supposed to be determined.
ASTM standards were developed through broad consensus for that reason. They guide engineers without replacing their thinking. They allow engineers to adapt to real-world conditions rather than forcing reality into a rigid framework.
The proposed rule, as currently drafted, risks reversing that approach. It replaces flexible, science-based reasoning with prescriptive mandates. It creates ambiguity where clarity is needed. It increases cost where access should be protected. And it introduces the possibility that engineers will be judged not by the quality of their analysis, but by their adherence to a checklist.
The comment that prompted this discussion was exactly right. This conversation needs to happen in the open. Because the question is no longer just about engineering standards. It is about who controls the outcome. That is not a theoretical concern. It is a practical one.
Thought For The Day
“In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is.”
— Yogi Berra
1 Formal Technical Critique of Proposed Rule, Chapter 61G15-38: Responsibility Rules of Professional Engineers Concerning the Evaluation of Damaged Structures. Grindley Williams Engineering. (March 2026).